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Introduction1 
This paper reports empirical work on the relationship between 
organisational status and performance in the UK. There is a belief that a 
change from public to private ownership (privatisation) results in improved 
performance. However, ownership is only an element in a complex model 
determining performance. Other variables include the extent of competition, 
internal management incentives and structures, and the external environment 
as reflected in government economic policy and expectations (e.g. the 
enterprise culture, the level of taxation). On this basis, a change in the 
status of an organisation associated with different managerial incentives 
and internal structures, without any change in ownership, may account for a 
change in performance. Some commentators, though, believe that managerial 
incentives and internal structures are inter-related with ownership. 
Organisational status is viewed as a spectrum embracing changes within 
the UK public sector from a government department to a trading fund or to a 
public corporation, as well as changes in ownership between the public and 
private sectors (privatisation and nationalisation). Hypotheses on the 
relationship between a change in organisational status or in ownership and 
improved performance raise questions about why the change has arisen and 
how such hypotheses might be tested. Since the relevant analytical 
framework has been presented elsewhere, (Dunsire, et al 1988) the current - -I 
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Government Initiative. Thanks are due to Bob Lavers, Research Fellow, 
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paper focuses on empirical testing. The analytical basis of the central 
hypothesis is outlined briefly, and the various performance measures are 
reviewed after which the paper describes the sample of UK organisations 
studied and presents the empirical results, on the productivity and 
employment effects of changes in organisational status. 
The Hvnothesis 
Why might performance be related to organisational status including 
ownership? Economists have focused on the differences in incentives 
between public and private organisations arising from differences in the 
ability of owners to monitor managers: a problem which arises when the 
goals of principals and agents diverge. In the property rights literature, 
it is argued that organisations with private property rights will have 
higher efficiency leading to more profit than organisations in the public 
sector where rights to profit are diffused and unclear (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1974; De Alessi, 1980). Even in 
private sector joint stock companies where there is a divorce between 
management and ownership (directors and shareholders), property rights 
theorists suggest that the private capital market and the threat of 
takeover limit managerial discretionary behaviour. The absence of similar 
transferable property rights in public sector assets means that there is no 
comparable takeover threat (Alchian, 1965). 
An additional dimension is provided by public choice theory which 
suggests inefficiency and waste in government reflected in rent-seeking, 
over-manning and an easier life in the public sector (government failure: 
Mitchell, 1988). However, both the property rights and public choice 
approaches are largely based on a priori reasoning and lack firm empirical 
support. In addition, the variety of organisational forms in the public 
and private sectors raises questions about the value and applicability of 
broad public versus private comparisons. The property rights and public 
choice literatures have little to say about the performance differences 
between organisations within the public and private sectors; although it 
follows from the literature that when rights to profits become more 
attenuated efficiency will decline. Similarly, in managerial economics the 
more discretion that management has to pursue non-profit goals the less 
efficient the organisation is likely to be (Williamson, 1964; Leibenstein, 
1966). 
In this study we are interested in investigating the effects of 
changes in organisational status both within the public sector and between 
the public and private sectors in the UK. Figure 1 summarises our 
approach. On the west to east axis of Figure 1 are positioned certain 
organisational forms intended to represent the main types in the public and 
private sectors, namely, government department, quasi-governmental 
agencies, public corporations, hybrids, private sector PLCs (public limited 
companies) and owner-managed firms. They are broad categories, but further 
subdivision is unnecessary for our analysis. 
Figure 1 Here 
A government department is positioned in the far west of Figure 1. 
Its main feature is direct political control. According to public choice 
theory this organisational form should suffer from short-term political 
goals, damaging political intervention in decision making, bureaucratic 
self-seeking (e.g. tenure) and a lack of entrepreneurship. The next 
category is the quasi-governmental agency, incorporating 'quangos' and 
trading funds such as the Royal Mint and HMSO. Trading funds remain 
responsible to a government minister but are expected to finance their 
operations commercially by charging for goods and services instead of being 
dependent, like government departments, on annual Parliamentary votes and 
appropriations. Quasi-governmental agencies were created to reduce 
political intervention and to produce a more commercially orientated 
management of resources. The expectation is that such agencies will use 
resources more efficiently than government departments, so that 
transferring functions to non-departmental agencies increases managerial 
independence and hence efficiency (a proposition which is the basis of 
current UK policy to move within the civil service from bureau to agency 
status). 
Public corporations were established to operate at even more 'arms 
length' from government; a constitutional relationship which was intended 
to combine efficient management with accountability (Morrison, 1933). A UK 
public corporation is a corporate body which can sue and be sued; it can 
hold property in its own right; almost all external financing is in the 
form of loan stock guaranteed by the government; and its employees are not 
civil servants. Political control comes through the issuing of ministerial 
directives and through the appointment and dismissal of members of the 
corporation boards. In principle, public corporations are further removed 
from direct political intervention than other non-governmental agencies, 
with the boards responsible for day-to-day management and for agreeing 
longer-term corporate strategy with the government. This relationship was 
intended to promote commercial operations and efficient management and to 
remove the threat of harmful political interference. In practice, the 
division of responsibilities between corporation boards and ministers has 
been a source of conflict (NEDO, 1976) and since board members are salaried 
and cannot appropriate profits, this may dull incentives to be efficient. 
Nevertheless, our hypothesis derived from the public choice and property 
rights literature, and as represented in Figure 1, is that a movement 
east;lards within the public sector raises efficiency. 
Within the private sector, the sole proprietor business where property 
rights are unattenuated so that there is maximum incentive to achieve 
profit by operating efficiently is located in the far east of Figure 1. 
This broad heading also includes private companies and partnerships where 
there is a negligible principal and agent problem, Moving west, the next 
category is the public joint stock company where ownership and control are 
divorced but property rights theorists suggest that the capital market 
constraint, the threat of takeover, constrains managerial behaviour. 
Finally, at the interface between the public and private sectors is a 
hybrid group, including those organisations which do not neatly fit into 
the other categories. Examples include not-for-profit organisations such 
as charities, clubs, mutuals and churches; private sector companies . 
receiving appreciable government subsidy; and perhaps firms highly 
dependent upon government contracts. Although this study does not test the 
effects of changes of organisational status within the private sector, our 
schema, which is consistent with the property rights and public choice 
literature, suggests that organisational changes will have their most 
profound effect on performance the further the distance organisations move 
on the west to east axis (for a fuller discussion of the schema, see 
Dunsire et al, 1988). 
In addition to formal organisational status, another possible 
determinant of performance is competition in the product market (Caves and 
Christensen, 1980; Millward and Parker, 1983; Parker, 1985; Kay and 
Thompson, 1986). A firm may remain in business and be inefficient if the 
market is neither contested nor contestable. The scope for non-profit 
maximising behaviour declines the more competitive is the product market. 
Also, some government departments and agencies hold monopoly rights over 
-the provision of goods and services, which might be expected to reduce both 
allocative and productive efficiency. In Figure 1 movement down the 
north-south axis represents an increase in the degree of competition, with 
monopoly and perfect competition identified as extremes. Thus, in Figure 1 
organisations are constrained both by their organisational status and their 
product market. An organisation's position within the ABXY space can now 
be plotted and hypotheses regarding performance changes established. For 
example, a private sector natural monopoly will be positioned in the north- 
east with ownership incentives to be efficient but with no product market 
competition. A monopolistic public enterprise by comparison will lie in 
the north-west, suggesting the existence of neither ownership nor product 
market pressures to be efficient. The south-east and south-west quadrants 
contain competitive private and public enterprises, respectively. The 
former is likely to be more efficient in terms of property rights and 
public choice analyses since, unlike the competitive public enterprise, 
there is a private capital market constraint on managerial behaviour. 
In terms of Figure 1, our central hypothesis is that an organisation 
'improves' its PerfOLmanCe as its status is chanqed on a west to east 
spectrum, ranging from government department, through agencies such as 
trading funds and public corporations, to public joint stock companies, and 
ultimately owner-managed firms. The representation suggests that 
organisational changes which involve movements north to south or west to 
east are likely to produce performance improvements, with movements south 
to north or east to west leading to lower efficiency. The remainder of the 
paper is concerned with testing our central hypothesis about organisational 
status and performance. Immediately, questions arise as to how enterprise 
performance is to be measured. 
Measurinq Performance 
The obvious focus is on efficiency in both its allocative and 
technical forms. However, given the inevitable difficulties in obtaining 
data on marginal costs, the study focused on identifying changes in 
production efficiency or, more generally, how well an organisation uses its 
resources. This is also the main focus of the property rights and public 
choice literature. 
Having chosen to study production efficiency, there is still the 
problem of what precisely to measure. An organisation might appear 
efficient in terms of, say, labour productivity but have low profitability 
or inefficient use of fixed or working capital. To help overcome this, 
efficiency was considered using a number of criteria, including financial 
measures commonly used by accountants in assessing business performance as 
well as some standard economic measures, such as partial and total factor 
productivity. One advantage of this approach is that it acts as a check on 
whether the results of studies of organisational status and performance 
vary according to the efficiency measure selected. For reasons of space, 
however, the results reported in this paper relate only to employment and 
labour productivity. 
Testing hypotheses relating organisational status and performance is 
not without its problems. Allowance has to be made for what would have 
happened without the change: for the likelihood that a transfer of 
ownership will result in the pursuit of different objectives; for 
anticipation effects whereby performance might improve prior to a status 
change; and for the possibility of substantial lags in improved performance 
following the change. Indeed, the possibility of both anticipation and lag 
effects raises doubts about relying on the publicly-announced date of the 
status change. Finally, and ideally, a model is required which holds 
constant all other relevant variables, so isolating any contribution of 
it has to be ‘ status change to improved performance. For example, 
recognised that between 1979 and 1987, labour productivity in the UK rose 
substantially so that the Wsuccesses of privatisation" need to be judged 
against the economy's general performance (Crafts 1988). In this paper 
the counter-factual is represented by general trends in the UK economy, and 
for public corporations where relevant. 
Applied to employment, it is hypothesised that a west to east movement 
in Figure 1 will be associated with a shake-out of labour as organisational 
slack and over-manning are reduced and hence productivity is improved. 
This was tested initially using figures of the growth in labour 
productivity around the time of the status change. To assess the longer 
term effects, an organisational status variable was incorporated into a 
standard employment function which takes the general form: 
Lt = C + biVi + CixVi + DVSC + Ut 
where L is employment; C is a constant; V is a vec'tor of variables, , 
notably, output, a time-trend and a lagged dependent variable; X is a 
slope shift dummy variable for status change applied to V; DVSC is an 
intercept shift dummy variable for status change; ut = stochastic error 
term; bi = (-rWar), X/G% and 1 - > where r is the trend growth of product- 
ivity; is the speed at which actual employment adjusts to its desired 
level (0 < X < 1); a is the elasticity of output with respect to employment 
and the equation is in natural logarithms (Ball and St. Cyr, 1966; Hartley. 
and Lynk, 1983; Killingsworth, 1970). Positive coefficients were predicted 
for output and the lagged dependent variable,, whilst a negative 
relationship was expected for the time-trend. For the intercept dummy 
representing status change, a negative relationship was predicted for a 
west-east move and a positve relationship for an east-west move, as shown 
in Figure 1. The dummy was also used in its slope shift form to estimate 
any favourable performance effects of status change on output, productivity 
trends and on the speed of adjustment. 
Various criticisms can be made of the employment model. It assumes 
cost-minimising behaviour subject to a Cobb-Douglas production function and 
a simple adjustment mechanism; that the capital stock and technology can be 
represented by a time-trend; and it is a single equation model. Nor in our 
case were data available for hours worked. Alternative formulations of 
labour demand equations have used a CES production function and have 
included lagged hours worked, relative factor prices, real labour costs, 
peak productivity, and lagged output variables with equations allowing for 
structural breaks. SOme alternative formulations were estimated, including 
real wage and lagged output variables (Peel and Walker and Treasury 
models, respectively: see Kilpatrick and Naisbitt 1984). However, our 
preference for the above standard employment function reflected three 
factors. First, resource constraints and the availability of data. Our 
task was to attempt various tests of the status change hypothesis and not 
to devote our limited resources to refining production functions. Second, 
when tested against alternative employment functions, the above model has 
performed more satisfactorily on statistical grounds (Kilpatrick and 
Naisbitt, 1984, ~22). Third, dummy variables have previously been included 
successfully in a standard employment function to estimate for the effects 
of a shake-out of labour (Hartley and Lynk 1983). 
The Organisations 
Ten organisations were selected for our study. With the exception of 
British Airways (BA), each has been subject to at least one organizational 
change, and the group embraces the main status movements shown in Figure 1. 
BA is included as an example of an anticipated status change. The 
organisations selected were ones for which there were reasonably 
comprehensive published accounts and reports covering a substantial period 
both before and after the status change so that the selection was not 
random. Nevertheless, there are no grounds to believe that they are 
unrepresentative. Some of the organisations selected, such as Rolls Royce 
(RR), have recently experienced a further change of status (privatisation), 
but such recent changes are not included in the study owing to insufficient 
data since the change. In addition to BA and RR, the organisations 
selected are the Post Office postal (POP) and telecommunication (POT) 
services (now British Telecom), the National Freight Corporation (later 
Consortium: NFC), The Royal Ordnance Factories (ROE'), the Royal Mint (RM), 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO), British Aerospace (BAe) and London 
Transport (LT). 
The PO had been a government department since 1840 and took over the 
operation of all UK telecommunications (except in Kingston-upon-Hull) in 
1912. The status change with which we are concerned is the transfer from 
government department to public corporation of the PO and more especially 
its two main businesses - postal services and telecommunications - in 1969. 
In postal services, the PO held a complete monopoly of normal mail 
services, but not parcels and courier deliveries, and of telecommunications 
in the UK (excluding Kingston-upon-Hull) until the 1980s. 
The NFC was established on 1 January 1971 as a public corporation to 
take over the public sector freight undertakings of the Transport Holding 
Company (notably British Road Transport Services and Pickfords) and of 
British Rail (National Carriers and Freightliner). The result was 
Britain's largest transport, distribution, storage and travel business. 
However, unlike the Post Office, from the outset it faced competition from 
a large number of smaller and more specialised transport firms as well as 
competition from rail and air. Throughout the period, studied, the NFC 
controlled under 10 per cent of the UK road haulage market. In 1982 the 
assets of the Corporation were transferred to the private sector in a 
management and staff buy-out, assisted by bank finance. Over 10,000 
employees and their families bought shares and today around 65 per cent of 
the workers own shares in the company. This privatisation is generally 
considered to have been a marked success with a substantial appreciation in 
the value of shares since privatisation. The NFC chairman, Sir Peter 
Thompson, refers to worker ownership as 'magic ingredient X' (Veljanovski, 
1987, p139). However, the privatisation occurred towards the end of the 
early 1980s recession and the extent to which performance has improved, if 
at all, when studied over a longer period with adjustments for other 
influences remains to be demonstrated. Also, until 1988 the shares in NFC 
were not publicly quoted so there was no takeover threat to spur 
management; and in the property rights literature worker ownership means 
diffused ownership rights leading to less efficiency. 
The ROF were first established during the period 1937-43 and on 1 July 
1974 became the first British trading fund. The ROF manufactures small 
arms, ammunition and explosives, weapons and fighting vehicles, with a 
domestic monopoly in some of its products. As well as supplying the UK 
armed services, the ROF also-supplies the armed forces of Commonwealth and 
other 'friendly' governments. After 1974, although personnel remained 
civil servants and subject to the pay and conditions of the civil service, 
the ROF was no longer financed by annual votes and appropriations. 
Instead, financial objectives were established under the Trading Funds Act 
1973 and specified by Treasury minute covering, in particular, borrowing 
powers, depreciation policy and return on assets. While remaining under 
the control of the Secretary of State for Defence, the ROF was required to 
adopt commercial practices and 'to pay for all supplies of goods and 
services received and to charge for all supplies both to government 
departments and other customers at home and abroad' (Appropriation Accounts 
H of C (136) 1976/77, ~01.1, class l-111). In 1984 the ROF was 
incorporated as a holding company with a number of divisions, which were 
privatised by sale to BAe in 1987 (with Vickers plc purchasing the tank 
business of ROF Leeds in 1986). However, this study concentrates on the 
transfer of the ROF from direct government department control to a trading 
fund in 1974., 
Our research project considered two other organisations which were 
transferred from a government department to a trading fund, namely, the RM, 
with a history of responsibility for minting the coin of the realm and 
commemorative and other medals; and HMSO, which is the government's 
publisher and distributor of official reports and similar documents. The 
RM became a trading fund in 1975 and the HMSO in 1980. In addition, BA is 
taken as an example of anticipated change. BA was established in 1973 in a 
merger of two state-owned airlines. The decision to denationalise was 
announced in 1980, but action was postponed until 1987 due to adverse 
trading conditions and law suits in the USA relating to the collapse of 
Laker Airways: hence BA has substantial experience of anticipating a 
status change and was included in the study as an example of possible 
anticipation effects. 
In February 1971 RR changed its status from a privately-owned to a 
publicly-owned limited company when the then Conservative Government 
purchased the gas turbine (aero and marine engine) and nuclear propulsion 
businesses of the company, together with the name RR, from the receiver. 
The company had experienced serious financial difficulties following severe 
cost overruns on its RB 211 engine development programme. RR's status 
change, therefore, contrasts with the other organisations because it was 
unplanned and coincided with a major crisis. The company which is a 
domestic monopoly remained in the public sector until it was privatised in 
May 1987 by a public flotation of shares. This study considers the effect 
of the movement into the public sector in 1971 (an east to west movement in 
Figure 1). 
BAe was established by the 1974-79 Labour Government under the 
Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977, which brought together into 
a single public corporation a number of private sector companies, namely, 
the British Aircraft Corporation (Holdings) Ltd., Hawker Siddeley Ltd. 
(Aviation and Dynamics) and Scottish Aviation Ltd. BAe which has a 
domestic monopoly is involved in the supply of military aircraft, guided 
weapons and electronics, civil aircraft, space and communications and later 
munitions with the acquisition of the ROF in 1987. In opposition in 1977, 
the Conservative Party pledged itself to denationalise BAe at the earliest 
opportunity. Returned to power in 1979 the pledge was honoured and the 
privatisation process was begun with the sale of 51.6 per cent of the 
shares in British Aerospace plc in February 1981 and the remainder of the 
ordinary shares in May 1985. The government retains a 'golden share' to 
prevent a foreign takeover of this key defence supplier and from a property 
rights perspective this existence of a barrier to a takeover implies a loss 
of incentive for management to be efficient. Nevertheless, our central 
hypothesis suggests that the status change in 1977 should have reduced 
efficiency and the change in 1981 should have increased efficiency. Both 
changes in status are considered. Although privatisation was not completed 
until 1985, at the time of the sale of the first tranche of shares the 
government pledged that it would no longer interfere in the running of the 
company and therefore this date can be taken as the date of privatisation. 
The final organisation studied is LT. Transport in the capital was 
first placed under the‘control of a public corporation in 1933 to produce a 
planned and co-ordinated public transport system. LT has since gone 
through a number of reorganisations while remaining a public corporation. 
Between 1948 and 1962 the London Transport Executive was an operating 
subsidiary of the British Transport Commission, which also was responsible 
for British Railways. With the demise of the BTC, from 1 January 1963 to 
the end of 1969 the London Transport Board was directly answerable to the 
Department of Transport and operated like other public corporations. 
However, between 1970 and 1984, as the London Transport Executive, London 
Transport became answerable to a local authority, the Greater London 
Council (GLC). During this period there seems to have been considerably 
more direct political interference in the organisation's operations than 
had existed earlier or since. In particular, pricing policy was often 
determined by political and social rather than economic or commercial 
criteria. In 1984, as London Regional Transport, the corporation became 
once again answerable to central government. Although in strict legal 
terms London Transport remained a public corporation throughout, in terms 
of our schema (Figure 1) the transfer to the GLC is treated as a movement 
from a public corporation to a government department status, while the 
change in 1984 is treated as a movement back from a government department 
to a public corporation. Both movements are studied. 
Figure 2 summarises the status changes for each of the ten 
organisations using the model developed in Section 2. Given their 
dependence on government, for Rolls Royce, and BAe the dotted line between 
the hybrid and joint stock company categories is intended to reflect the 
ambiguity about theirstatus before being taken into public ownership in 
1971. For BAe and LT two status changes are shown. In all cases, any 
significant changes in competition in the product market which broadly 
coincided with the status change are reflected in a movement on the north- 
south axis. Only in the cases of BAe on nationalisation, when competitive 
producers were merged, and LT in the mid-1980s when bus routes became 
contestable, is there evidence of such movement. In the other cases there 
does not appear to have been an important change in product market . 
competition contemporaneous with the status change. The fact that there 
was such little change in the competition variable makes it easier to 
identify the impact of organisational status. Some of the major 
characteristics of the organisations are shown in Table 1. 
Figure 2 and Table 1 Here 
Empirical Results 
The empirical results are reported at three levels. First, basic 
labour productivity growth figures are discussed. Second, these results 
are considered in the light of employment function regressions. Finally, 
the productivity trends are compared with changes in national productivity. 
(a) Labour productivity qrowth 
Table 2 presents the results for the mean growth in labour product- 
ivity for the four years before and after the status change. Where an 
organisation went through two status changes in the period considered, two 
sets of results are presented. Four year periods were selected as a 
reasonable compromise between providing figures for a long period, which 
could reflect factors wholly unrelated to the status change,! and too short 
a period which could relate to one or two unrepresentative years. Four 
year periods also reflect changes in productivity which relate to the 
status change but which precede the change - anticipatory effects - or 
which take sometime to take effect - lagged effects. Where the four year 
results, however, are biased by the inclusion of an unrepresentative 
productivity figure a different average is computed and shown in the table 
in parenthesis. 
Table 2 Here 
. 
In the cases of both the Post Office postal and telecommunications 
businesses the movement from a government department to a public 
corporation status appears to have led to the rise in labour productivity 
which our model of status change predicted. In telecommunications the 
growth of productivity more than doubled in the early 1970s. In the postal 
business the result is less impressive with the slow fall in productivity 
recorded in the second half of the 1960s replaced by a modest growth in 
productivity in the early 1970s. The postal business, however, suffered a 
severe strike in 1971 related to the government's prices and incomes 
policy, which undermined productivity in that year. Leaving out that year, 
average productivity growth after the status change was a more healthy 
5.26%. In both cases productivity was measured as turnover deflated by the 
Post Office’s own price series for postal and telecommunications, 
respectively. 
For LT three sets of figures are reported representing different 
measures of output. LT(1) is output measured by passenger miles; LT(2) 
turnover deflated by a price series derived from LT’s reported revenue per 
mile; and LRT(3) is turnover plus local and central government price 
compensation payments deflated by the non-food RPI. Under Greater London 
Council control prices were held down to encourage the use of public 
transport in London and LT was compensated from taxation. 
The results using passenger miles suggest a slightly slower 
productivity growth after LT became accountable to the GLC, as our model 
predicts. This is not supported, however, by the other two output 
measures. Allowing for price compensation payments, productivity appears 
to have risen slightly after 1970; while based upon the revenue per mile 
price series there was a much sharper, productivity improvement. These 
inconsistent results suggest the need for caution in deciding upon the 
effect of the first status change. The results for the second status 
change, however, are less ambiguous with productivity leaping using the 
LT(1) and LT(2) series when LT ceased to be supervised by the GLC and 
achieved greater managerial autonomy. This is especially so if 
productivity before the second status change is estimated leaving out 1983, 
which was a particularly good year and may be the consequence of an 
anticipatory effect. These results are shown in parentheses. Only when 
compensation payments are included (LT(3)) does productivity appear not to 
have improved; but again the rise in productivity growth is confirmed 
(9.31% p.a. ) if 1986-88 is taken as the post-status period. These results 
are supported by a closer study of the underlying figures. Between the 
period 1971 and 1982 productivity growth was actually negative in 9 of the 
years using passenger miles and in 8 of the years using deflated turnover 
as the output measure. Since 1983 both series reveal that productivity 
growth has been in double figures. 
Turning to the ROF, our model predicts that the movement from direct 
departmental control to trading fund status within government should have 
led to a rise in productivity. However, measures based upon deflating 
output using the ROF's SIC group price deflator (mechanical engineering) 
ROF(1)) and as a cross-check by the non-food RR1 (ROF(2)), both suggest a 
marked fall in the growth of labour productivity. Initial results for 
Rolls Royce also were contrary to our expectation. The takeover by the 
state in 1971 appears to have led to a significant rise in labour 
productivity growth after a very disappointing performance in the four 
years prior to the company's financial collapse. This might well be 
explained by the one-off 'shock' effect of financial collapse, which 
encouraged management to remove major inefficiencies including overmanning. 
To test for this, productivity growth was measured from 1975 to 1978 to see 
whether the improved performance continued under state ownership. The 
results are in parentheses. Using output measures rele:vant to the 
company‘s SIC group and as a cross-check for the non-food RPI, it is 
apparent that the growth in productivity recorded for the early 1970s did 
not continue. This conclusion supports the view that the Rolls Royce 
results in the early 1970s are the consequence of one-off effects of the 
financial collapse. 
In the case of British Aerospace nationalisation was associated with 
a slowdown in productivity growth and privatisation with a marked recovery 
in performance, as predicted by our model. Again output was measured using 
both the relevant SIC group price series (BAe(1)) and the non-food RPI 
tBAet2) 1. Study of the annual productivity figures reinforces the 
conclusion that there was a serious decline in performance following 
nationalisation. Taking aggregate output and employment for the companies 
which were brought together as British Aerospace on nationalisation, in 
only 1 out of the 4 years before 1977 was productivity growth negative. In 
contrast, in none of the years since privatisation in 1981 has productivity 
fallen. 
In 2 out of the 4 years that BAe was in the state sector productivity 
was negative. 
Our model is also supported by the results for the National E'reight 
Consortium where output was measured using turnover deflated by the 
government's transport and distribution price series and the non-food RPI, 
again as a cross-check. In this case productivity growth was fast in the 
years before the status change, probably reflecting the need to be more 
efficient given a highly competitive product market (the NE, although 
large, represented under 10% of the total UK freight market in our period). 
The company also appears to have suffered a deterioration in performance in 
the four years following privatisation. This result, however, occurs 
because of a significant jump in productivity in 1981 and a fall in 
productivity in the year of privatisation, 1981/82. Taking out these 
unrepresentative years and comparing productivity growth in 1977-80 and 
1983-86, a large growth in productivity is recorded (the relevant figures 
are in parentheses in Table 2). 
To assess the performance of British Airways in the 4 years before and 
after the announcement that the company was to be privatised in 1980, 
labour productivity was measured using available tonne kilometres as an 
output measure. Initially it appears that productivity growth declined 
whereas the promise (or threat) of privatisation might have been expected 
to lead to a managerial drive to raise efficiency. Once again, however, 
the basic results need to be heavily qualified because the early 1980s was 
an especially difficult period for airlines. The world recession led to a 
falloff in business and consequently intensified competition. As a result 
productivity in British Airways stagnated between 1980 and 1982 before 
management undertook major de-manning and productivity growth recovered. 
Average productivity growth rose to 8.16% per annum in the four years 1981 
to 1984 and to 11.94% per annum taking the years 1983-86. In other words, 
it appears to have taken some time to rationalise the business following 
the trading difficulties in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The run up to 
privatisation did produce the expected efficiency gains though at least in 
part they reflected adjustment to the new trading conditions of the 1980s. 
A similar time lag appears to have affected the HMSO on becoming a 
trading fund in 1980. There was a large fall in labour productivity in 
1980/81 followed by a recovery. However, in the case of the HMSO 
productivity growth appears to have been stagnant or rising relatively 
slowly depending upon the output price deflator used prior to the status 
change, so that even including 1980181 in the post-status change figures, 
productivity rose markedly. Excluding this year, labour productivity rose 
by an even more impressive 15% per annum. 
Finally, the Royal Mint which became a trading fund a little earlier, 
in 1975, seems also to have recorded a large rise in productivity, 
reversing a serious decline in the years 1972-75. Between 1976 and 1979 
productivity grew by 8.75% per annum. In this case, however, the result is 
biased upwards by an especially strong leap in productivity in 1976. 
Leaving out this exceptional year productivity Jrowth averaged 1.3% p.a., a 
more modest performance, but still a marked improvement on earlier years. 
(b) Emplovment functions 
I 
In general the labour productivity results support our status change 
model outlined earlier. But they are open to three major objections: (i) 
mean growth figures may conceal trends in growth; for example, if the 
productivity growth rate was rising b,oth before and after the status 
change, an improved performance would be attributed to the status change 
even though it had had no significant effect upon the trend; (ii) the 
choice of the four year periods is arbitrary and in particular results 
based on these periods might not be representative if a longer-view is 
taken (this is evident especially in the cases of Rolls Royce and National 
Freight as we have already observed); (iii) the averages may reflect 
changes in national productivity trends. For instance from 1974 to 1980 
productivity growth in the whole of the UK economy and in UK manufacturing 
was very low, whereas in the 1980s productivity growth, especially in 
manufacturing, has been high. 
To meet objections (i) and (ii) labour productivity is now assessed 
using employment equations as detailed earlier in the paper. Objection 
(iii) is tackled in section (c) of the paper below. 
Various employment functions were fitted using shift and slope dummies 
to represent the status change. The date of the status change was also 
altered by +2 years to reflect leads and lags in performance adjustment. 
Ball and St. Cyr, Peel and Walker and Treasury formulations of the 
employment function were tried and equations were also fitted to test for 
illogical returns to scale (Kilpatrick and Naisbitt 1984). In general the 
Ball and St. Cyr formulation provided the most satisfactory results in 
terms of t statistics and adjusted R2* In most cases a real wage variable, 
introduced as an explanatory variable in the Peel and Walker employment 
function was not significant. The Treasury equation also was generally 
unsatisfactory; though this probably results from the lagged output 
variable and the use of annualised data. The Treasury model is designed 
for use with quarterly data and it is not too surprising that output often 
had no statistically significant effect on employment twelve months later. 
The introduction of 'leads and lags' for the status change in general did 
not affect the overall results; where it did this is noted. 
Table 3 provides employment equations for each of the ten 
organisations studied. In all cases the most significant equations only 
are reported. For most organisations interaction terms (slope dummies) 
were fitted. Where they helped to reveal the impact of the status change 
they are included; elsewhere the effect.of the status change is reflected 
in a shift dummy. In most cases the long-run employment elasticity (e) is 
less than unity (and in a few cases more than unity) in the Ball and St. 
Cyr functions, which implies that the returns to labour parameter in the 
underlying production function is greater than unity. One possible 
explanation is labour hoarding (cf. Morgan, 1979, p7) which we might expect 
especially in publicly-owned organisations lacking a firm budget constraint 
and in the 1960s and early 1970s when there were labour shortages in the 
UK. An alternative explanation lies in the underlying production function, 
which takes the Cobb-Douglas form. This may be inapplicable for a number 
of our organisations - though the other employment functions tried usually 
provided inferior fits. 
Also we would expect the long-run elasticity (e) to be greater than 
the short-run elasticity (the coefficient on output) because it takes time 
to shed labour. This was borne out in most though not all cases, In some 
cases the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable was insignificant. 
Again this result may relate to weaknesses in the underlying model or to 
the use of annualised rather than, say, quarterly data (only annualised 
data are available in published accounts and reports). 
Table 3 Here 
Turning to specific results, for the Post Office's postal services 
there is no support for the view that productivity improved after the 
status change in 1969. The shift dummy is negative but statistically 
insignificant (PO postal (1)). Omitting the strike year 1971 improved the 
coefficient on the dummy slightly but it was still not significant at the 
10% level or better (equation 2). In both cases the expected relationship 
with output exists but there is evidence of less efficiency over time (the 
coefficient on t is significant but positive). This bears out a suggestion 
in other studies (e.g. Pryke, 1981) that the postal service was inefficient 
in its use of new technology introduced in this period, notably mechanical 
sorting of mail. Reference to the figures on labour productivity changes 
in the postal service confirms that in 10 of the 22 years between 1960 and 
1981 productivity declined, sometimes sharply. 
It did not prove straight forward to fit any of our employment 
functions to the Post Office telecommunications data. The equation in 
Table 3 is of the Ball and St. Cyr form and only the lagged dependent 
variable is statistically significant. Particularly worrying are the 
insignificant coefficient on output and on time in an industry subject to 
major technical advances. Omitting the lagged dependent variable did 
produce the following interesting result, however, and without a serious 
loss in the overall significance of the equation: 
PO telecom. Emp. - 10.76C + 0.741ogQ - 0.05t - 0.12D 
(46.03) (3.69) (2.76) (3.12) 
t values in parenthesis 
R2=0.78 
with all coefficients significant at the 1% level except t which is 
significant at the 5% level. This equation confirms that employment 
efficiency did improve after the status change. However, the result must 
be treated with caution since removing lagged employment involves a 
departure from the employment model, where employment adjusts to its 
optimal level with a lag. Perhaps removal of the lagged dependent variable 
can be justified where there are inflexible labour contracts which prevent 
the operation of the expected adjustment process. Telecommunications in 
the UK is highly unionised. The equation has similarities to the Treasury 
employment equation, though lagged output was not significant and is 
therefore not reported. 
The results in equations 1 to 3 for London Regional Transport bear out 
improved performance related to the second status change, especially when 
the dummy is applied from 1983 as in equation LT(1) (the year prior to the 
status change). This is so whether output is measured using deflated 
turnover or passenger miles; although only at the 10% level. In all cases 
the coefficient on output is negative implying considerable inefficiency in 
the use of labour, while the time variable is insignificant suggesting poor 
use of capital. If this explanatory variable is omitted then the 
improvement in performance from 1983 is more evident: 
LT Emp. = 5.1X - 0.2Olog.Q + 0.69LogNtel + 0.02Dl - 0.06D2 R2=0.80 
(1.23) (1.71) (2.28) (0.57) (2.93) 
There is, however, no evidence that the first status change in any 
formulations of the employment function had an effect on employment. 
Consider equation LT(4), which is based on turnover plus price compensation 
payments. In this equation output now has the expected sign though the 
large coefficient on lagged employment implies a negative long run 
employment elasticity; which could suggest high inefficiency or problems 
with the underlying employment model. Also, now neither status change 
appears to have had a significant effect on employment; though this result 
is especially sensitive to the year chosen to test for the effects of the 
status change. 
Turning to the ROF two output measures are used and the resulting 
equations reported. Both equations produce good fits and the expected 
signs for output, the lagged dependent variable and time over the period 
studied, 1968-1984. But the dummy variable, contrary to expectation, is 
positive and significant thus confirming the result from the productivity 
figures reported earlier. Apparently transfer from control by a government 
department to trading fund status in 1975 was associated with reduced 
efficiency in the use of labour. The finding is similar for Rolls Royce 
where a rise in employment efficiency on transfer into public ownership is 
confirmed, notwithstanding the earlier comments about the deterioration of 
performance in the mid-1970s. 
For BAe the standard employment function with and without interaction terms 
provided a poor fit and is not reported. Instead an equation based upon 
the Treasury employment function provided more useful results though the 
lagged output variable was insignificant and hence is omitted. The lack 
of significance probably results from the use of annualised data, as 
mentioned earlier. Two equations are presented in Table 3 reflecting 
different price deflators for output. The dummy variables relate to the 
two periods of private ownership and compare with the period of 
nationalisation. Although the shift dummies are positive, the interaction 
terms on output suggest a marked improvement in employment efficiency 
especially during the second period of private ownership. In other words, 
the coefficient on output was substantially higher during nationalisation 
implying a greater increase in employment to produce any given increase in 
output: a result which supports the findings for labour productivity 
reported earlier. 
Turning to National Freight three equations are presented in Table 3; 
two with shift dummies only based upon different price deflators and a 
third including an interaction term on output. Equations with only a shift 
dummy suggest, surprisingly, that there was no significant increase in 
employment efficiency at the 10% level or better (though the sign is 
negative as expected). The coefficient on lagged employment is also 
insignificant suggesting that employment fully adjusts to its optimum 
within 12 months; though this is not so surprising given the competitive 
environment in which the NFC operates. The inclusion of an interaction 
term on output, however, reveals that prior to the status change the output 
coefficient was insignificant but became significant following 
privatisation. In addition, the shift dummy is now significantly negative 
suggesting a large increase in employment efficiency following the status 
change. 
British Airways has been included in our sample of organisations 
undergoing relevant status changes because the decision to privatise BA was 
announced in 1980. Subsequently privatisation was postponed until 1987 for 
reasons outlined earlier. Three equations are reported. Equations 1 and 3 
measure output using available tonne kilometres. Equation 2 by contrast is 
turnover deflated by the non-food RPI. In equations 1 and 2 the dummy is 
applied to 1980, in equation 3 to 1982 to reflect the lag in performance 
improvement noted earlier. Equations 1 and 2 provide the expected signs on 
output, the lagged dependent variable and time but suggest that the status 
change had an insignificant effect on employment at the 10% level or better 
(two-tail test). Lagging the dummy variable (equation 3) provides 
evidence of improvedlperformance at the 10% level. 
In the case of HMSO, a poor fit was achieved when the standard 
employment equation was applied to the data and the date of the status 
change was taken as 1980 (equation 1). Other employment functions were 
tried but also produced unsatisfactory results. Adopting a lagged dummy, 
however, proved more rewarding. Equation 2 shows the results of taking the 
status change as 1982. The equation provides a good fit and the status 
change dummy is negative and significant at the 1% level. 
Finally, in the case of the Royal Mint the Ball and St. Cyr employment 
function provided a poor fit. Again this might be explained in terms of 
hoarding labour to meet sudden changes in demand. The output of the Royal 
Mint fluctuates, largely depending upon the need for more domestic 
currency. The Peel and Walker formulations were more satisfactory and are 
reported in equations 1 and 2. There was evidence of multicollinearity 
between especially output and the lagged dependent variable. Dropping the 
latter improved the significance of the coefficient on output and the 
coefficient on the shift dummy with little loss in the overall fit of the 
equation. The results suggest that the movement to trading fund status led 
to an improvement in efficiency as reflected in the shift dummy, though 
this was in part offset by an increase in the coefficient on output. 
(c) Controlling for 'other factors' 
Time series analysis of the type undertaken here is subject to error 
arising from changes in 'other factors'. Productivity may have risen or 
fallen not due to the status change but due to some exogeneous factor or 
factors, such as changes in national productivity growth. In an attempt to 
reflect such exogeneous factors, Table 4 presents the productivity figures 
in Table 2 as a ratio of productivity growth in the whole economy, in UK 
public corporations and in UK manufacturing industry (where relevant) in 
the four years before and after status change or other periods as 
indicated. In interpreting the results we are looking for evidence that 
performance improved or deteriorated after the status change. 
addition a ratio of unity suggests that productivity growth 
organisation matched exactly the growth in the relevant UK index. 
of less than unity implies an inferior performance and greater than 
superior result. 
But in 
in the 
A ratio 
unity a 
In the cases of the Post office telecommunications business, the HNSO 
and the Royal Mint productivity performance improved in relation to UK 
productivity and public corporation productivity growth following the 
change in status. For the HMSO and the Royal Mint involved in 
manufacturing, a comparison with UK manufacturing productivity growth also 
. supports the view that performance improved. The performance of the Post 
Office postal business shows a particularly strong improvement when the 
1971 strike year is excluded. Turning to the Royal Ordnance Factories and 
Rolls Royce, the earlier productivity and employment function results are 
supported with clear evidence of a decline in performance and an 
improvement of performance, respectively (though in the case of Rolls Royce 
this improved performance was reversed in the mid-1970s) contrary to our 
central hypothesis. 
For those organisations with two status changes, London Transport's 
productivity growth compared with the whole economy and the average for 
public corporations appears to have improved marginally when the 
organisation became accountable to the GLC, contrary to our expectation. 
However, the improvement did not last. Through the 1970s there is evidence 
of a major loss of efficiency especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
In accordance with our central hypothesis the second status change led to a 
marked improvement in labour productivity, even when compared with the 
significant productivity growth in the rest of the economy and in public 
corporations since 1982. For British Aerospace the results are even more 
clear cut, with comparative productivity growth dropping substantially 
during the period of nationalisation and recovering after privatisation. 
Turning to the National Freight Consortium comparative productivity growth 
improved between 1983 and 1986, supporting the view that privatisation 
raised efficiency. But comparative efficiency also rose and at a faster 
rate between 1978 and 1981, implying that there was considerable scope for 
efficiency gains and that these could be achieved under public ownership. 
The NFC comparisons are particularly sensitive to the periods chosen. In 
the case of British Airways, which remained in the public sector throughout 
the period studied,, after a good comparative productivity performance in 
the late 197Os, performance deteriorated. It recovered especially from 
1983 when overmanning was tackled, again suggesting that the improvement in 
performance following the announcement of privatisation in 1980 was 
delayed. 
Conclusions 
Three measures of employment efficiency have been used to capture the 
short-term effect of a change in organisational status, longer-term effects 
and to reflect changes in employment performance at the national level. In 
all cases, except the Post Office postal business, the results based upon 
the three measures were consistent. In the case of the postal service, the 
employment function result reflects a deterioration in performance from the 
mid-1970s. The results are summarised in Table 5. 
Table S Here 
In general, our central hypothesis that changes in status from west to 
east in Figure 1 lead to improvements in employment efficiency is 
supported. The only exceptions were the ROF, Rolls Royce and one of the 
changes for LT. The Rolls Royce result is probably explained by the 'shock 
effect' of bankruptcy leading to necessary reorganisation rather than by 
any beneficial effects of public ownership. The ROF'S apparent failure to 
produce the expected gains in employment efficiency may be interpreted as 
supporting the view that 'short' movements on the west to east spectrum are 
less likely to lead to marked efficiency gains than 'long' moves. This has 
obvious implications for public policy. At the same time, the ROF results 
might also reflect the lack of any change in its position as a defence 
contractor operating in a protected and regulated market. With LT, the 
efficiency improvements were contrrary to expectations but they were not 
sustained. 
Employment efficiency is, of course, but one measure of production 
efficiency. Further empirical work is being undertaken which tests our 
central hypothesis using financial ratios, total factor productivity and 
various indicators of changes in the internal organisation of enterprises 
(Dunsire et & 1988). 
Table 1 The Organisations 
Organisation Status Change Date of Change Time-period 
of study 
1. PO Postal Govt. dept. to 1969 1959-81 
Public carp. 
2. PO Telecommun- Govt. dept. to 1969 1959-81 
ications Public Corp. 
3. NFC Public carp. to 
employee buy-out 
1982 1970-86 
4. ROF Govt. dept. to 1974 1968-84 
trading fund 
5. RM Govt. dept. to 
trading fund 
197s 1965-86 
6. HMSO Govt. dept. to 
trading fund 
1980 1976-88 
7. LT a) Public carp. to a) 1970 
Govt. dept. 
b) Govt. dept. to b) 1984 
Public carp. 
1963-87 
8. BAe a) Private to a) 1977 
Public 
1970-86 
b) Denationalised b) 1981 
9. RR Private to 1971 1960-81 
Publicly owned company 
10. BA Anticipation offer 
of privatisation 
1980 1973-86 
Table 2 Average Annual Growth in Labour Productivity 
PO postal 
PO telecom 
LT(l) 
33(Z) 
LT(3) 
ROF(1) 
ROF(2) 
RR(l) 
M(2) 
BAe(l) 
BAe(2) 
WC(l) 
NFC(2) 
BA 
Ht-fsO(l) 
HMsO(2) 
RM 
Notes 
Organisations: 
4 years . 
before status 
change 1 
-1.12 
5.01 
2.43 
0.04 
4.13 
9.41 
13.55 
-0.46 
-0.30 
6.26 
9.02 
5.09 (0.51) 
6.09 (2.11) 
7.49 
-0.46 
4.75 
-5.56 
PO-Post Office, LT-London Transport (later London Regional 
-0.31 (-3.72) 19.83 
5.65 5.16 (9.31) 
4 years 4 years 4 years 
after status before status after status 
change 1 change 2 change 2 
1.33 (5.62) 
11.34 
2.08 3.25 (-4.06) 15.92 
3.57 
5.56 
3.47 
4.40 
16.52 (-1.39) 
13.55 (-3.65) 
2.43 2.43 7.76 
1.60 1.60 6.85 
3.99 (8.17) 
2.41 (6.49) 
4.81 (8.19) 
(11.61) 
4.91 (15.19) 
11.88 (15.33) 
8.75 (1.30) 
Transport), ROF-Royal Ordnance Factories, RR=Rolls Royce, BAe=British 
Aerospace, WC-National Freight Corporation (later Consortium), BA-British 
Airways, HMSO=Her Majesty's Stationery Office, RM=Royal Mint. 
Output measure used as basis of productivity figures: PO postal and PO 
telecom - turnover deflated by the Post Office's postal and telecom 
price series respectively: LT(l) passenger miles, LT(2) turnover deflated 
by price series derived from information on revenue per mile in accounts, 
LT(3) turnover plus central and local government price compensation 
payments deflated by the non-food retail price index; ROF(1) output 
deflated by the ROF's SIC group price deflator, prices mechanical 
engineering; ROF(2) output deflated by the non-food retail price index; 
RR( 1) output deflated by RR’s SIC group price deflator, prices mechanical 
engineering; RR(2) output deflated by the non-food retail price index; 
BAe(1) output deflated by BAe’s SIC group price deflator, prices mechanical 
engineering; BAe(2) output deflated by the non-food retail price index; 
NFC(l) turnover deflated by NFC’s SIC group price deflator, prices 
transport and distribution; WC(2) turnover deflated by the non-food retail 
price index; BA available tonne kilometres; HMSO(l) output deflated by non- 
food RPI, HMSO(2) output deflated by prices printing and publishing, RM 
number of coins minted. 
Orgaoisatioo C 
Table 3 Eadonent Puoctioos 
WI loq$q The 01 D2 Xl X2 X e ii* 
PO postal(l) 7.04” t 0.10’ t 0.351 t 0.01’ - 0.01 0,65 0.15 0,72 
(3.50) (2.15) (1.97) (2,23) (0.55) 
PO postal(!) 7.19” t 0.11’ t 0.33’ + 0.01’ - 0.01 
(3.47) (2.19) (l.alj (2.26) 10071) 
0.67 0.16 0.73 
PO tc1em 
lJ(ll 
RUil) 
ROP[!I 
RR(lI 
f@(Z) 
Bhe( 1) 
BAe(2) 
NFC(1) 
NIC(2) 
RFC(3) 
3.25' t 0.21 t O-71'* - 0.01 - 0.31 
(2.081 (1.23) (4.91) (1.12) (1.06) 
6074 - 0.25' t 0,60' + 0.01 t 0.01 - 0.05I 
(1.47) (1.91) (1.861 (0.881 (0.271 (1.62) 
4.30 - 0031' t 0.80' - 0.01 - 0.01 - o.o4z 
(1.00) (1.99) (2.58) (0.10) (0.38) (1.35) 
-2.04 - 0.3i't 1.38 
1, 
- 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.0J4 
(1.72) (4.33) (13.59) (0,87) (0.50) (1.86) 
-2.07 t 0026’ t 1.11” - 0.01’ t 0.01 + 0.01 
(1.26) (2.53) (6.92) (2.31) (0.24) (0.20) 
2.38' t O.ZO*‘t 0.79” - 0.02’* t 0.11” 
(2.34) (3.20) (8.41) (5.12) (4.26) 
2.23' + 0.15' t 0.80" - 0,112" t 0.09' 
(2.101 (2.691 (7.85) (4.53) (2.66) 
4.65" t 0012' + 0.51" t 0.01 - 0.13” 
(3.23) (2.20) (4.20) (0.03) (4.32) 
3.99' + 0.13' + 0.57" t 0.01 - 0,13” 
(2.53) (1.94) (4.53) (0.06) (4.27) 
8.30" t 0.54' - O.Oll t 2.23 t 3.67' 
(6.25) (2.79) (2.19) (1.28J (2.39) 
6.65" t 0.80' - 0.02' t 4.73# + 5.19' 
(3.36) (2.79) (2.50) (2.16) (2.36) 
7.10’ t 0.48”t 0.27 - 0.02' - 0.08 
(2.68) (4.33) (1.52) (2.17) (1.36) 
6.74" + 0.7O"t 0.16 - 0.03" - 0.06 
(3.18) (6.30) (0.94) (3.04) (1.17) 
21.48" - 0.25 - 0026 - 0.09" - 7.46" 
(4.41) (1.03) (1.22) (4.12) (3.27) 
0.29 0 0.90 
0.40 - 0.63 0.81 
0.20 - 1.55 0.91 
- 0.38 1400 0.96 
- 0.11 - 2.36 0.92 
0.21 0.95 0.88 
0.20 0%75 0.86 
0.49 0.24 0.92 
0.43 0.30 0.92 
- 0.31 - 0,50' 0.52 
(1.26) (2.34) 
- 0.66l - 0.71' 0.53 
(2.15) (2.32) 
1.00 0.48 0.98 
1.00 0.70 0.98 
” 
+ 1.46 
(3.24) 
1.00 0 (a) 0.99 
1.46(b) 
Ml) 2.95' + 0.60"t 0.47 
,I 
- 0.03' - 0.07I 
Bl.13) 
(2.60) (3.35) (4.04) (2.92) (1.64) 
1.64 + 0.87' t 0.54" - 0.04' t 0.09 
('I.721 (2.341 (3.271 (2.36) (0.97) 
1.94" + 0.67”t 0.49” - 0.03' - O.O# 
(1.68) (4.05) (4.70) (3.14) (2.04) 
HnsO(1) 
linso(2) 
fJul1 
@uZl 
4.09 + 0.03 + 0.68" - 0.02 - 0.08 
(1.16) (0.12) (3.69) (1.05) (0.70) 
6.22' + 0.20' + 0.36' - 0.02' - 0.19" 
(2.29) (2.08) (2.16) (1.59) (3.95) 
-0.38 + Oo13' + 0.44' t 0.01 - 2.23' 
(0.15) (1.50) (2.03) (1.01) (1.63) 
3.44x + 0.21' + o-01 - 3.25' 
(1.12) (2042) (0.24) (2032) 
0.53 
0.46 
0.51 
0.32 
- o.55t' 0.56 
(2.96) 
- 0.41' + 0.43' - 
(2.17) (2.30) 
1.13 0.96 
1.89 0.90 
1.30 0.97 
0 0.97 
0.99 
0.23 0.74 
- 0.69 
Notes I 
R2 is adjusted for degree of freedom; 
on lagged employment); e = 
X speed of adjustment (l-coefficient 
output divided by X). 
long-run employment elasticity (coefficient on 
Although our central hypothesis suggests a direction of change in 
performance, we have applied 2 tail tests on the grounds that performance 
may have changed in any direction. Thus except where indicated by x, which 
indicates significant at 10% level 1 tail test only, in all cases ** 
indicates significant at the 1% level. * at the 5% level, # at the 10% 
level using 2 tail tests. Figures in brackets are t-ratios 
Xl-DlxlogQ except for RM where = real wages; X2-D2xlogQ 
a=pre-status change; b- post-status change 
All equations reported were considered for first order serial correlation 
using the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative technique and the standard errors were 
found to be consistent in the presence of lagged dependent variables. 
Output measures: 
PO postal (1) and (2) and telecom-output deflated by the Post Office's own 
relevant price deflators; 
LT(l)-passenger miles, (2)=turnover deflated by LT price deflator, 
(3)Pturnover deflated by non-food RPI, (4)lturnover plus compensation 
payments deflated by non-food RPI. 
ROP,RR and BAe (l)-output deflated by prices mechanical engineering; ROF,RR 
(2)lturnover deflated by non-food RPI; 
NFC(1)(3)- turnover deflated by prices transport and distribution; NE'(2)= 
turnover deflated by non-food RPI; 
BA(1)(3)- available tonne kilometres,(2)=turnover deflated by non-food RPI; 
HMS0(1)(2)-output deflated by prices printing and publishing. 
R&f(1)(2)-number of coins minted. 
Table 4 Controllinc for national productivity changes: 
comparative average productivity growth 
Organisation Productivity of 
Organisation/ 
avg.productivity 
economy 
PO postal 
1966-69 
1970-73 
1970,72,73 
PO telecom 
1966-69 
1970-73 
LT 
1967-70 
1971-74 
1979-82 
1980-83 
1985-88 
ROE' 
1971-74 
1975-78 
RR 
1969-70 
1971-74 
1975-78 
BAe 
1973-76 
1977-80 
1981-84 
NFC 
1977-80 
1978-81 
1982-85 
1983-86 
BA 
1976-79 
1980-83 
1981-84 
1983-86 
HMSO 
1977-80 
1981-84 
-0.39 -0.16 
-0.48 -0.81 
1.92 3.23 
1.76 0.71 
4.06 6.87 
0.81 0.39 
1.17 0.70 
-3.00 -0.56 
1.74 0.45 
8.38 * 
5.29 
2.14 
-0.10 
7.61 
-2.24 
8.03 
1.98 
2.82 
1.72 
6.03 
0.82 
2.56 
3.12 1.16 
2.56 0.66 
2.97 1.25 
4.70 5.24 
-0.37 -0.12 -5.75 
1.79 0.75 0.81 
n/a 
n/a 
2.48 
2.24 
-0.08 
3.57 
-2.34 
2.57 
1.03 
1.28 
n/a 
Productivity of Productivity of 
Organisation/ Organisation/ 
avg.productivity avg.productivity 
public UK manufacturing 
corporations 
n/a 
3.75 
0.75 
-0.05 
5.40 
-0.80 
1.11 
0.62 
1.19 
0.53 
0.86 
0.38 
2.83 
n/a 
RN 
1972-75 . -7.72 -1.87 -2.16 
1976-79 3.65 1.36 3.69 
1977-79 0.56 0.29 0.94 
Note 
- Privatisation sales distorted productivity figures for this period l 
n/a not applicable, non-manufacturing business. 
Sources: 
Whole economy and UK manufacturing figures CSO-Datastream; public 
corporation figures own series based upon sales at constant prices. 
. 
Table 5 Summary of Results 
Central hypothesis supported? 
Measure Labour productivity employment comparative 
growth function productivity 
growth 
PO postal 
PO telecom 
LT(lst change) 
LT(2nd change) 
ROF 
RR* 
BAe(lst change) 
BAe(2nd change) 
NFC 
BA 
HMSO 
RM 
Notes 
Yes 
Yes 
mainly No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
limited support 
No 
limited support 
No 
No 
limited support 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
* Comments on Rolls Royce relate to the years immediately after transfer 
into state ownership. The improved performance did not continue 
through the mid-1970s. 
, -- 
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